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SEEKING A UNIFIED FIELD OF CLIMATE
FINANCE
David P. Cluchey*
CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY RICHARD
B. STEWART, BENEDICT KINGSBURY, & BRYCE RUDYK. NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY PRESS. 2009.
The collection of essays on climate change, edited by Richard
Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, and Bryce Rudyk, takes on the ambitious
goal of constructing “a unified field of climate finance from a very
diverse body of practice and ideas.”1 While it does not entirely achieve
this goal, this volume, with its thirty-five essays and a comprehensive
introductory chapter by the three editors, makes a useful contribution to
the literature in the field. Given the brevity of the essays (other than the
introduction, none exceeds ten pages and most are significantly shorter)
the book is particularly helpful for the reader looking for a broad but
sophisticated overview of a multi-faceted topic with a wide variety of
complex sub-issues.
The process of creating programs to reduce the levels of greenhouse
gases released into the atmosphere has evolved since the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change entered into force in 1994.2
The steps taken in the Kyoto Protocol of 1998 reflected promise,3 but the
results of last December’s conference in Copenhagen were
disappointing.4 The preliminary versions of the essays in Climate
* Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law.
1. CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT xii (Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, & Bryce
Rudyk eds., 2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE FINANCE].
2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 21, 1994,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
3. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
December 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
4. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/12/19/science/earth/19climate.html; John Vidal, Allegra Stratton and Suzanne
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Finance were presented at a conference in Abu Dhabi in May of 2009
and the final versions of the essays were published promptly thereafter
(September 2009). The timing of the conference and the publication
appears to be directly related to influencing the planned climate summit
in Copenhagen in December, 2009. Climate Finance is not a traditional
academic treatment of the issues discussed in its essays, but rather a
reflection of the origin of the essays in conference presentations with an
apparent objective of short-term impact on climate policy discussions at
the Copenhagen Summit.
Stewart, Kingsbury, and Ryduk have a general sense of what they
believe would constitute an effective and politically-viable financial
strategy for promoting climate mitigation. In their introduction they
identify three factors which they describe as the “key determinants” of
climate finance.5 The first, and most significant, of these factors is
“climate science imperatives.”6 However, this is not a book about
climate science and the editors dispense with this factor in a paragraph
and devote only a single essay to it.7 Although there remains scattered
controversy about the causes and the extent of climate change,
Oppenheimer’s essay presents the consensus case for the very serious
implications of failing to respond promptly and effectively to the
problem of global warming and it does so concisely and compellingly.
The real concerns of the editors are the other two factors they
identify as key to climate finance, financing needs and mitigation
opportunities, and the political economy of climate policy.8 These two
factors, broadly conceived, are the focus of most of the essays in this
book.
Climate Finance is divided into six parts. The first part, “Climate
Mitigation: Overview and Key Themes”, includes the introduction by
the editors and essays on climate change,9 funds needed for mitigation of

Goldenberg, Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/
dec/18/copenhagen-deal.
5. Richard B. Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury, & Bryce Rudyk, Climate Finance for
Limiting Emissions and Promoting Green Development, in CLIMATE FINANCE 4.
6. Id.
7. Michael Oppenheimer, Understanding the Causes and Implications of Climate
Change, in CLIMATE FINANCE 35-41.
8. Stewart, Kingsbury, & Ryduk, supra note 5, at 4-6.
9. See Oppenheimer, supra note 7.
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climate change,10 and the need for a “more flexible architecture” for
climate finance.11 The authors of each of these essays are respected
experts, two of them are academics and the third has served in both the
government and non-government organization sectors. These essays lay
the foundation for the approaches and mechanisms suggested in later
essays.
Part II of the book is the longest section (at almost 100 pages) and is
focused on recommendations for reform of financing mechanisms. In
the first of these essays, the author, associated with the Environmental
Defense Fund, makes the case for the use of cap and trade mechanisms
over the alternative of a carbon tax.12 This is the only essay directly
dealing with this issue and the resolution of the debate in favor of cap
and trade is consistent with the editors’ view of the issue.13 The only
other discussion of the issue is found in a later essay in another section of
the book, suggesting possible advantages of the carbon tax approach.14 It
is clear that the editors have decided not to elaborate on the debate
between cap and trade and carbon tax approaches and the remainder of
the essays are largely focused on specific issues relating to the cap and
trade mechanism. Nonetheless, a more extensive acknowledgement of
the cap and trade/carbon tax controversy and a more balanced treatment
of the debate would have been a useful addition to the book.
The other essays in Part II discuss a variety of important topics
relating to the structure of mitigation programs. There is a single essay
on the reform of the Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM).15 The CDM is an effort to encourage developed countries to
meet their mitigation commitments, in part, by funding clean energy and
mitigation schemes in developing countries. While it is acknowledged
10. Bert Metz, The Climate Financing Problem: Funds Needed for Global Climate
Change Mitigation Vastly Exceed Funds Currently Available, in CLIMATE FINANCE 4247.
11. Daniel Bodansky, The Future of Climate Governance: Creating a More Flexible
Architecture, in CLIMATE FINANCE 48-52.
12. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap-and-Trade is Preferable to a Carbon Tax, in CLIMATE
FINANCE 57-64.
13. Stewart, Kingsbury, & Ryduk, supra note 5, at 8.
14. Lily Batchelder, Fiscal Considerations in Curbing Climate Change, in CLIMATE
FINANCE 291-99. Professor Batchelder suggests, among other issues, that given the
regressive effect of climate change mitigation measures, the need for additional revenue
to ameliorate the effect of these measures on the less well-off members of society might
be more likely met by a carbon tax. Id. at 291.
15. Charlotte Streck, Expectations and Reality of the Clean Development Mechanism:
A Climate Finance Instrument between Accusation and Aspiration, in CLIMATE FINANCE
67-75.
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that the CDM has cut the costs of compliance for some developed
countries, its contribution to sustainable and efficient development is
debated.16 Several essays discuss the importance of sectoral focus in any
financing mechanism, with particular emphasis on forest and land use
programs in the developing world.17 Two essays discuss leveraging
trading to generate additional funds for mitigation programs, reflecting
the concern that trading alone will not provide sufficient funds to meet
mitigation goals.18 There is an essay on the importance of linking trading
systems19 and several on the role of private investment in cap and trade
markets and the perspectives of private investors.20
In contrast to Part II, which examines the details of structuring the
market mechanisms for dealing with mitigation investments, Parts III and
V of Climate Finance are concerned with two very broad issues essential
to the success of any multilateral mitigation initiative. Part III focuses on
the current disconnect between developed and developing countries and
discusses approaches which might help allay the concerns of developing
countries and ensure their active participation in the climate change
mitigation process. Part V explores the relationship between climate
mitigation and finance issues and trade regulation under the auspices of
the WTO.
The essay by Ghosh and Woods in Part III21 starkly lays out the level
of distrust between the developed and the developing countries in the
negotiations on climate mitigation. This distrust is the culmination of
many years of failure of communication and understanding on a wide
16. Id. at 69-71.
17. Murray Ward, Why a Successful Climate Change Agreement Needs Sectoral
Elements, in CLIMATE FINANCE 79-84; Ruben Kraiem, Sectoral Crediting: Getting the
Incentives Right for Private Investors, in CLIMATE FINANCE 85-89; Eric C. Bettelheim,
Forest and Land Use Programs Must Be Given Financial Credit in Any Climate Change
Agreement, in CLIMATE FINANCE 90-95; Israil Klabin, Stock-and-Flow Mechanisms to
Reduce Land Use, Land Use Change, and Forestry Emissions: A Proposal from Brazil,
in CLIMATE FINANCE 96-101.
18. Bert Metz, Mitigating Climate Change at Manageable Cost: The Catalyst
Proposal, in CLIMATE FINANCE 105-10; Annie Petsonk et al., Engaging Developing
Countries by Incentivizing Early Action, in CLIMATE FINANCE 111-21.
19. Henry Derwent, Carbon Market Design: Beyond the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, in CLIMATE FINANCE 125-31.
20. Marcel Brinkman, Incentivizing Private Investment in Climate Change Mitigation,
in CLIMATE FINANCE 135-42; Nick Robins and Mark Fulton, Investment Opportunities
and Catalysts: Analysis and Proposals from the Climate Finance Industry on Funding
Climate Mitigation, in CLIMATE FINANCE 143-51.
21. Arunabha Ghosh & Ngaire Woods, Developing Country Concerns about Climate
Finance Proposals Priorities, Trust, and the Credible Donor Problem, in CLIMATE
FINANCE 157-164.
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range of issues.22 There is skepticism among the developing nations
toward the Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank, based in part on the disproportionate voting
power of the developed countries in these institutions.23 This skepticism
extends also to the World Trade Organization where the developing
country members have been dissatisfied with the implementation of a
variety of Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly those in agriculture
and intellectual property.24 The authors point out that this distrust makes
reliance on the Bretton Woods institutions to manage climate finance
programs or as conduits for financial support of mitigation efforts in
developing countries problematic.25
The essential disagreement between the developed and developing
countries in the area of climate mitigation is the question of who will
bear the costs (both out-of-pocket and in foregone development) incurred
by the developing countries in mitigating emissions. Ghosh and Woods
suggest three steps that could be taken to help build trust among the
developing nations:
1. Ensure the Creation of a Secure Pool of Climate Finance.
2. Use (or Build) Trusted Institutions for Decision making and
Disbursement of Finance.
3. Develop Effective Monitoring, Verification, and Compliance
Mechanisms for Financing and Technology Transfer
Commitments.26
These suggestions have, thus far, not found resonance among
developed nations who would prefer to limit their investment in
developing country mitigation efforts and to manage the financial
commitments they have made through multilateral institutions with
which they have long experience, i.e. the Bretton Woods institutions.
The main point of the Ghosh and Woods essay, that a multilateral
commitment by the developing countries to climate mitigation will only
follow from serious negotiations and commitments by the developed
nations, is well taken. Ultimately, the developed nations will have to
respond to this position if they wish to achieve significant multilateral
climate mitigation cooperation.

22. See generally, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
23. Id. at 12, 224-27. See generally, Stephen Zamora, Voting in International
Economic Organizations, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 566 (1980).
24. STIGLITZ, supra note 22, at 7-8, 245-46.
25. Ghosh & Woods, supra note 21, at 161-62.
26. Id. at 160-63.
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The other essays in Part III discuss specific issues related to the
ongoing disconnect between the developing and developed countries,
including an interesting proposal by the Korean Ambassador for Climate
Change to move to a so-called “bottom-up regime” that focuses on
nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) reflecting the
voluntary choices of individual countries on appropriate approaches to
mitigation.27 Three of the essays deal with conditionality, reflecting the
reality that the developed countries are unlikely to provide significant
amounts of funding for climate mitigation to developing countries
without attaching conditions to the use of money and requiring the
achievement of mitigation objectives.28 Overall, Part III is an excellent
treatment of the obstacles to be overcome to ensure the future
involvement of developing countries in the multilateral climate
mitigation process.
The relationship between trade and climate finance, dealt with in Part
V of Climate Finance, is a complicated one.29 The concern that
environmental regulations can be used to advance protectionist goals is
serious and has been the subject of previous multilateral trade
negotiations.30 On the other hand, environmental regulation is an
important task of government and the original General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) recognized environmental and conservation
exceptions to the strict application of trade rules.31

27. Rae Kwon Chung, Operationalizing a Bottom-Up Regime: Registering and
Crediting NAMAs, in CLIMATE FINANCE 179-85.
28. Jacob Werksman, From Coercive Conditionality to Agreed Conditions: The Only
Future for Future Climate Finance, in CLIMATE FINANCE 189-96; Kevin E. Davis &
Sarah Dadush, Getting Climate-Related Conditionality Right, in CLIMATE FINANCE 197205; Ngaire Woods, Making Climate Finance Work: What Might Climate Change
Experts Learn from the Experience of Development Assistance?, in CLIMATE FINANCE
206-10.
29. For a more detailed treatment, see GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ &
JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (Peterson Institute for
International Economics 2009).
30. See RAJ BHALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW: THE GATT-WTO
SYSTEM, REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, AND U.S. LAW § 1-6(b) (LEXIS Law Publishing 1998).
The Uruguay Round Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade and on the Application
of
Sanitary
and
Phytosanitary
Measures
can
be
found
at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm (last visited June 3, 2010).
31. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947), Article XX (b) (excepting
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”) and (g) (“relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources…”), 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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A number of important issues on the relationship of trade law to
climate finance are explored in six essays in Climate Finance.32
Particularly interesting is Border Climate Adjustment as Climate Policy
by Alexandra Khrebtukova, discussing the potential and the legality of
the imposition of carbon tariffs reflecting the climate impact of imported
goods.33
Part IV of Climate Finance examines specific national experiences
related to climate mitigation and the lessons to be taken from those
experiences. Three of these essays focus on the climate policies of,
respectively, the United States, the European Union, and China.34 The
essay on the U.S. situation, by Nathaniel O. Keohane (Director of
Economic Policy and Analysis at the Environmental Defense Fund),
outlines the provisions of the Waxman-Markey bill passed by the U.S.
House of Representatives in June, 2009.35 While the ambitious approach
taken by this bill is laudable (e.g., 83% decrease in 2005 greenhouse gas
emissions by 2050), Congressional action this year on a comprehensive
approach to decreasing greenhouse gas emissions now seems unlikely.36
When action is finally taken by the U.S. Congress, it is likely to be
somewhat less ambitious than the Waxman-Markey bill. Although the
32. Gabrielle Marceau, The WTO and Climate Finance: Overview of the Key Issues,
in CLIMATE FINANCE 247-53; Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Carbon Trading and the
CDM in WTO Law, in CLIMATE FINANCE 254-58; Robert Howse and Antonia Eliason,
Countervailing Duties and subsidies for Climate Mitigation: What Is, and What Is Not,
WTO-Compatible?, in CLIMATE FINANCE 259-65; Alexandra Khrebtukova, Border
Climate Adjustment as Climate Policy, in CLIMATE FINANCE 266-71; Arunabha Ghosh,
Enforcing Climate Rules with Trade Measures: Five Recommendations for Trade Policy
Monitoring, in CLIMATE FINANCE 272-80; Sandra G. Mayson, Carbon Footprint Labeling
in Climate Finance: Governance and Trade Challenges of Calculating Products’ Carbon
Content, in CLIMATE FINANCE 281-87.
33. See Khrebtukova, supra note 32. Other commentators have endorsed the idea of a
carbon tax imposed at the border as an equalizer in imposing climate mitigation costs on
producers from nations that have not pursued equivalent mitigation efforts. See e.g., Paul
Krugman, Building a Green Economy, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 2010, at MM34, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/magazine/11Economy-t.html.
34. Nathaniel O. Keohane, Climate Legislation in the United States: Potential
Framework and Prospects for International Carbon Finance, in CLIMATE FINANCE 21320; James Chapman, The EU ETS: Experience to Date and Lessons for the Future, in
CLIMATE FINANCE 221-27; Jie Yu, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Measures
in China, in CLIMATE FINANCE 228-33.
35. Keohane, supra note 34.
36. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Graham Says He Could Vote for Climate Bill, but
Oil Spill Requires a ‘Time-Out’, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2010/05/07/07climatewire-graham-says-he-could-vote-for-climate-bill-b10855.html.
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review of the bill was helpful in the timeframe it was written, the run-up
to the Copenhagen Summit, an essay providing a more general
discussion of the various factors which will influence the ultimate
version of U.S. legislation would have been more broadly useful.
The detailed review of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) in
James Chapman’s essay is particularly impressive.37 It chronicles and
reports on the results to date of a successful cap and trade approach to
limiting greenhouse gas emissions. It also describes ways in which the
EU approach could be linked to other similar systems and includes EU
suggestions for dealing with the issue of including developing countries
in multilateral climate mitigation efforts. Overall, it accomplishes its
objective of setting out a concise and informative summary of EU
progress in limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
The essay on China, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation
Measures in China, acknowledges China’s unwillingness to commit to
binding emissions caps, but defends China’s investment in emission
reduction programs and discusses China’s growing focus on sustainable
technology as part of its economic growth strategy.38 The author argues
that China’s effort to reduce energy consumption per capita and in
selected industrial and electric power sectors will result in China
achieving reductions in greenhouse gas emissions that will, within five
years, match the reductions agreed to by Annex I nations under the
Kyoto Protocol. If this prediction is accurate, it is good news indeed.
The final part of the book, Part VI, entitled “Taxation of Carbon
Markets,” appears almost as an afterthought, though it raises very
important concerns for climate finance. Decisions on taxation create
incentives and disincentives that must be understood to avoid unintended
consequences. Professor Lily Batchelder’s essay, Fiscal Considerations
in Curbing Climate Change, is an excellent review of key fiscal issues
generated by both a cap-and-trade schemes and carbon taxes.39 Professor
Batchelder notes that climate mitigation programs tend to be regressive
with a disproportionate financial burden placed on lower income citizens.
She suggests approaches that will mitigate the regressive effect of costs
imposed to curb emissions, noting the revenue raising advantages of
carbon taxes and the risk of inequities and inefficiencies from the
distribution of free emission permits. Her treatment of the issue, while
concise, is sophisticated and useful.
37. See Chapman, supra note 34.
38. See Yu, supra note 34.
39. See Lily Bat Batchelder, Fiscal Considerations in Curbing Climate Change, in
CLIMATE FINANCE 291-99.
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Professor Yoram Margalioth discusses the tax treatment of cap-andtrade permits in Tax Consequences of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Schemes.40
In a very clearly written and concise essay, he surveys a number of
complex issues generated by different approaches to the taxation of
emission permits. He identifies a series of potential distortions and
disincentives as well as gaming risks and offers suggestions for avoiding
them. As with Professor Batchelder’s essay, his sophisticated treatment
of the issues will be helpful to any policymaker contemplating the
structure of a cap-and-trade scheme.
Overall, Climate Finance is well-conceived and well-executed. It
appears to have had limited success in its implicit objective of
influencing the Copenhagen Summit on climate change. It does,
however, provide a useful catalogue of issues that must be resolved
before a successful multilateral initiative can be fashioned to deal with
emissions caps and a trading system for those caps. A number of the
essays in the book also suggest sophisticated solutions to the resolution
of some of those issues. This gives the book continuing importance in
the debate about climate mitigation and the mechanisms necessary to
finance it.

40. See Yoram Margalioth, Tax Consequences of Carbon Cap-and-Trade Schemes, in
CLIMATE FINANCE 305-10.

